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The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby 
threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility to 
achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the 
optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition 
model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for 
redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the regulatory authority 
progressively raises the matching grants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and all 
districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is 
shown to increase total production and the level of redistribution. However it does not 
guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. 
Assuming complete information among districts, we first derive the willingness of each 
district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness 
to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and 
the efficient allocation of factors are achieved. We then describe the adjustment process for 
the matching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone 
will gain. 
JEL Code: H23, H70. 
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10 November 2006 
This paper was presented at the IFIR and CESIfo conference on ”New Directions in Fiscal 
Federalism” held in Lexington, Kentucky (14-16 September 2006). We thank our discussant 
Massimo Bordignon and conference participants for useful comments. 1 Introduction
The problem we address in this paper is the income protection of work 
ers in a market that is increasingly integrated. In Europe, wage subsidies
have been advocated for low skilled workers and partly implemented in some
countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands) in the form of reduced rates
of employers’ contributions to social security at low wages. The additional
employment due to the wage subsidies in France is estimated by Cr´ epon and
Deplatz (2002) at 470.000 persons; that is about 3% of total employment in
the private sector.
With the recent enlargement of the European Union, we need to address
the income protection of workers in a context where there is no legal barriers
to migration so that a migration externality is at work. According to Hans 
Werner Sinn (1990): ”Any country that tries to establish an insurance state
would be driven to bankruptcy because it would face emigration of the lucky
who are suppose to give and immigration of the unlucky who are supposed
to receive.”
This prediction of a ”race to the bottom” is too extreme; it rests on
limited theoretical and empircial support. This is probably due to the pres 
ence of signiﬁcant costs and barriers to migration. (Welfare shopping has
been discouraged in Europe by limiting portability across member states and
subjecting, for eligibility, to previous employment in the country). However
we believe that underprovision of income protection in an integrated labour
market is an issue that cannot be ignored in the EU. Even if it has not been
a pressing issue to date, ﬁscal competition for capital and labour factors
is already there. And with the enlargement, this issue will become more
pressing, as extensively discussed in Wildasin (2004).
The objective of this paper is to clarify the role of the EU in the provi 
sion of income protection to workers in the context of market integration.
Our proposal is EU co ﬁnancing of national transfers to workers through a
system of matching grants, with special attention to implementation.1The
key questions are: could a programme of matching grants, possibly at dif 
ferentiated rates, be adopted unanimously? Could it be so deﬁned that all
member states gain regardless of their diﬀerences? Could it be implemented
The paper is an extension of earlier versions presented at the TAPES conference of the
NBER and CESIfo on ”ﬁscal federalism” held in Munich (20-22 May 2004). Thanks are due
to our two discussants there Alex Plekhanov and Jacob L. Vigdor. We also thank seminar
participants at Bern, Bonn, Cologne, and Toulouse for their comments and suggestions.
1This proposal was ﬁrst developed by Jacques H. Dr` eze (2002) in a Tinbergen Lecture.
1voluntarily by member states (henceforth ”districts”) instead of being im 
posed by a perfectly informed and powerful central planner as suggested in
the existing literature (see Wildasin , 1991).
The motivation is enhanced eﬃciency rather than redistribution across
districts.The existing literature does not quite answer these questions: it
only provides an existence result for eﬃcient matching rates, assuming (
implicitely) that the net gains could be redistributed in a lump sum fashion
so that everyone beneﬁts, and that there exists a regulator with all the
relevant information to implement the eﬃcient solution.The more interesting
question is whether the eﬃcient policy could emerge from a negociation
process which simultaneously guarantees that an eﬃcient outcome is reached
and that every member state gains.
To clarify the issues, we start with a simple model proposed by Wildasin
(1991) in his paper ”Income Redistribution in a Common Labour Market”.
That model does not predict a race to the bottom but only too little redis 
tribution to the workers and ineﬃcient allocation of workers across districts.
Also, Wildasin (1991) shows that when labor is mobile and each district
seeks to redistribute income to workers through transfers it is possible to
achieve the eﬃcient allocation of labour and at the same time the optimal
level of redistribution by means of diﬀerentiated matching grants. Districts
with lower preference for redistribution should get higher matching grants
to equate transfer levels and achieve the eﬃcient allocation of labour.
The main problem with this analysis is that local preferences for redis 
tribution are not observable to the federal authority; even worse, the federal
authority required to operate these matching grants may not exist or have
the power to impose them to local authorities. In fact if such discretionary
power existed, the federal authority possessing all the relevant information
could directly implement the optimal solution by imposing a uniform trans 
fer in all districts. But this solution is hardly feasible in the European context
where redistribution policies are a competence of the states. The purpose
of this paper is to investigate the possibility of voluntary matching grants
among districts based on reciprocal matching; more precisely, we investigate
whether there exists some adjustment process based on each state’s decisions
that can bring about the optimal matching rates.2
It should be emphasized that our solution requires the participants to be
informed about the technology and tastes of the other participants. This is
because voluntary matching of the other participants’ contributions requires
2Another interesting approach that does not require the existence of a strong central
authority is the immigration controls as suggested in Wilson (2006).
2to know how they would respond to such matching. This is, of course, more
restrictive than one would like. Therefore as a complement to this process,
we propose another process that does not require complete information to
implement the optimal matching rates. The central idea is that the reg 
ulatory authority can correct ineﬃcient Nash equilibrium by raising the
matching rate of the district choosing the lowest transfer. This will induce
all other states to adjust their tansfer levels. These adjustments all around
will increase total production and the level of redistribution. This process is
budget balanced but it does not guarantee that every district will gain, nor
that an eﬃcient level of redistribution is attained.
We use the same model as Wildasin (1991) modulo the fact that districts
take into account that they will have to pay their share of the additional cost
of matching grants. In Wildasin, the presumption is that there are enough
districts for each to ignore the eﬀects of its policy on their contribution to
the ﬁnancing of matching grants. We develop our analysis in a general set
up of heterogenous districts that diﬀer both with respect to their preferences
and to their technologies.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework.
Pareto optimal allocations for this economy are characterized in Section
3. Section 4 proposes a simple process implementing eﬃcient matching
grants without assuming complete information among districts. Section 5
studies the willingness of districts to match contributions of other districts
under complete information. Section 6 uses these ﬁndings to investigate a
progressive adjustment process of matching rates so as to converge to the
eﬃcient solution, with the property that every state is made better oﬀ along
the way. Section 7 concludes.
2 The framework
A federation is composed of k ≥ 2 districts indexed by i. In each district
there is a large group of immobile residents; there are also li workers that
are mobile. Let L denote the the total number of workers in the economy.
Thus  
i
li = L. (1)
3The problem we address is related to, but more general than, the voluntary matching
models of Guttman (1978) or Varian (1994) who deal with pure public goods. They
propose a simple multistage mechanism and use the reﬁnement of subgame perfection ` a
la Moore-Repullo to implement an eﬃcient outcome.
3Each district produces a private consumption good with a speciﬁc ri 
cardian technology fi(li), which is increasing and concave (f′
i(li) > 0 and
f′′
i (li) < 0). Workers are paid their marginal product: wage in district i
is wi(li) = f′
i(li) which is decreasing with the number of workers in that
district: (w′
i(li) = f′′
i (li) < 0).
The per capita transfer that accrues to the workers in district i is denoted
zi. The total income of a worker in district i is thus w(li) + zi.4 Workers
can migrate costlessly from one district to another, hence necessarily for any
vector of transfers z = (z1,...,zi,...,zk):
w(li) + zi = w(lj) + zj ≡ c(z) ∀j,i. (2)
This generates an allocation of labor l(z) = (l1,...,li,...,lk) across districts
and a uniform income for the workers c = c(z). The labour demand function
in district i is li(wi) = li(c−zi) with l′
i(c−zi) = f
′′









≡ σi ∈ (0,1); (3)
and the general equilibrium eﬀect of a change in the transfer level zi on the
allocation of labour across districts is
dli
dzi
= −(1 − σi)l′




j < 0. (5)
Each district i receives the matching grants sizili from the federation (with
0 ≤ si ≤ 1) and contributes ϕi
 
j sjzjlj to balance the federal budget,
(with 0 ≤ ϕi ≤ 1 and
 
i ϕi = 1). Both subsidy rates si and contribution
rates ϕi are common knowledge. The districts represented by their immo 
bile residents member capture the return to the ﬁxed factors of production.
Hence the net income of the immobile residents in district i is
4Alex Plekhanov pointed out that if the ﬁrms were paying the transfer, they would
equal marginal product of labor to the wage plus the transfer, f
′
i(li) = wi + zi. This
alternative modelling is not interesting for our purpose since there will be no migration
externality associated with such transfers.
4yi = fi(li) − f′




= fi(li) − f′




The social welfare in each district i is an increasing function of the income
of its immobile residents and the income of its mobile workers,
Wi(yi,c) = yi + Ui(c). (7)
It is assumed to be quasi linear with partial derivatives Ui
cc < 0 < Ui
c.
Thus, Ui
c ≥ 0 denotes district i’s marginal willingness to redistribute income
to workers.5 Note that the objective function is independent of the number
of residents of either type;with free migration, li is endogeneous to the policy
choices.6
Districts choose their transfer level taking as given the transfer levels of




















































R is a coeﬃcient of relative










6This assumption of exogenous social welfare is again more restrictive than what one
would like. However allowing for a welfare function that depends on the relative number of
each group would make the analysis of the Nash equilibrium much more complex. Roberts
(1999) provides a ﬁrst step in this direction by examining the process and outcomes of
majority voting over public good in a club whose preferences and policy choices relate
to its membership; and in turn its policy choices determine its membership. See also
Dr` eze and Greenberg (1980) for a cooperative game approach where players’s preferences
are directly related to the composition of the coalition to which they belong (i.e; hedonic
coalition). They showed that eﬃciency requires transfers across coalitions and stability
requires penalties for leaving a coalition. It is also fair to say that there is no agreement in
social choice theory about how to make social welfare evaluation with variable population.
In particular using the utilitarian criterion with a variable population leads to the so-called
”repugnent” solution of an inﬁnitely large population with inﬁnitely low per capita utility.
5where σi is the change in the net income of the workers c resulting from
an increasin in zi, and −(1 − σi)l
′
i is the change in the number of workers
resulting from this increase in zi.
3 Pareto optimality with lump-sum taxes






























where λ = (λ1,...,λi,...,λk) is an arbitrary weighting system with λi > 0
and
 
i λi = 1. The necessary ﬁrst order conditions are,
∂Λ
∂li
=  (c − f′
i(li)) + υ = 0
∂Λ
∂yi
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i(li) = c+ υ
  is the productive eﬃciency condition (equal 








= 0 may be interpreted as the Bowen Lindahl Samuelson








> 0 means underprovision and conversely.7Given λ∗, the
pareto optimal solution is denoted l∗
i,y∗
i ,c∗.
Wildasin (1991) shows that without matching grants, the Nash equilib 
rium among districts will not be eﬃcient due to the migration externality.
Anticipating correctly the migration ﬂows and taking the transfer levels of
other districts as given, each district acting independently settles for a level
of redistribution that is too low (as expected from voluntary contributions
7Note that the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition does not preclude contributions to





− li ≶ 0 provided that on average
the diﬀerences cancel out.
6to a public good); also, wages are not equalised across districts resulting
in ineﬃcient allocation of labour. Wildasin (1991) proposes a solution in 
volving the intervention of a central regulator who can impose Pigovian cor 
rections in the form of matching grants. This existence result leaves open
the question of implementation. In particular how could such diﬀerentiated
matching grants be designed , when the regulator does not have access to
all the relevant information about technology and preferences required to
implement the eﬃcient outcome.
In Section 4, we investigate a simple budget balanced process that will
implement the eﬃcient allocation even if the agents involved do not know
the relevant information about all other agents. This process only requires
the regulatory authority to observe the transfer levels.
4 Implementing Matching grants
.The federal government is controlling the matching rates and each dis 
trict i is adjusting optimally its own zi to any change in its own matching
rate si and in the common income of the workers c. With quasi linearity of
welfare functions, there are no income eﬀects on the ﬁrst order conditions
(dWi
zi/dyi = 0). Production functions are approximated quadratically so
that σi and l′
i are treated as constants.
The process rests on a very simple intuition: observing a Nash equilib 
rium with an ineﬃcient allocation of labor and an ineﬃcient level of redis 
tribution, eﬀorts need to be made to reduce the dispersion of the transfers
while at the same time increasing (decreasing) the level of redistribution.
For a desired increase (which holds for suﬃciently low matching rates), this
is possible by raising the matching rate to the district choosing the low 
est transfer. More precisely, let current equilibrium choices be such that








dsi > 0, dsj = 0 ∀j  = i (the same reasoning applies under reversed signs).
This change dsi will induce district i to adjust its own transfer by dzi  = 0 to
remain on its ﬁrst order condition. This leads to an eﬀect dc = dc
dzidzi on c
and to migration dlj =
dlj
dc , ∀j  = i. Then all districts will respond optimally
to the resulting change in level of redistribution by dzj/dc  = 0. Each district
j will have to pay its share ϕj of the additional cost of the higher si and the
changes of zk’s all around. So the process is budget balanced. From (8) the
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   Ui
cc
    + ((1 − ϕi)si − σi)|l′
i|
[1 − (1 − ϕi)si(2 − σi)]|l′
i|
< 0 for σi < (1 − ϕi)si <
1
2
This condition is not unreasonable since σi < (1 − ϕi)si holds with
many districts and (1 − ϕi)si < 1
2 holds when starting from suﬃciently low
matching rates. All other districts will respond to the change in c. Therefore
given the initial dsi > 0, there obtain dzi
dsidsi > 0, dc
dsi



























dc dc < 0. To evaluate the welfare eﬀect of this change dsi,
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dlk
In this expresssion, the term
 
k cdlk cancels out since
 













































For all k  = i, dwk = dc − dzk > 0, implying dlk < 0. Also, because

















dc > 0, establishes from (12) that dΛ > 0.
Thus there has been a progress towards pareto eﬃciency.
We can repeat the process by selecting again the district with the lowest
transfer and raising its matching rate. The previous analysis indicates that it
will induce higher c and better allocation of labour causing a ”total welfare”
8This deﬁnition relies on λi = λj ∀i,j in (9), thus an increase in ”total welfare” implies
progress towards Pareto-eﬃciency.
9gain. The process will stop when zi ≃ zj , ∀i,j, which is the productive
eﬃciency condition. Therefore we have demonstrated the following result.
Proposition 1. Starting from an equilibrium with too little redistribu-
tion and ineﬃcient allocation of labour, consider the mechanism that, at
each point in time, increases the matching rate to the district choosing the
lowest transfer. When all other districts respond optimally, the total produc-
tion, the level of redistribution and total welfare are increasing over time.
Hence, every limit point of the process yields production eﬃciency but not
necessarily the eﬃcient level of redistribution.
That is our mechanism achieves an eﬃcient allocation of labour across
districts but not necessarily the eﬃcient level of redistribution. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that all districts gain along the process. Therefore
we now look for a mechanism which yields aPareto eﬃcient level of redis 
tribution and along which all districts gain, thus making the mechanism
acceptable to every agent. The mechanism is based on voluntary matching
grants across agents. In this approach agents set simultaneously their own
transfer levels and the rate at which they will match other agents’ transfers.
In contrast to the above mechanism we assume complete information among
agents.
5 Voluntary Matching grants
To investigate the voluntary provision of matching grants, we start by deriv 
ing the willingness to pay πij of district i for a matching rate sj to district
j. District i understands that: (i) district j will beneﬁt from a higher sj
on the transfers zj it pays to its workers and will accordingly be induced to
increase its own zj; (ii) the other districts k  = j (including district i) may do
the same and to diﬀerent extent (under asymmetry); and (iii) district i will
have to pay its share of the additional cost of the matching grants resulting


































     
z
= (i=j − ϕi)zjlj with i=j = 1 if i = j and i=j = 0 otherwise.



















This expression denotes the willingness of district i to pay for sj tak 
ing into account the impact of sj on district i’s contribution ϕi
 
k skzklk.





























































dsj       
cross eﬀect
(15)




i ϕi = 1.







































h + ϕiskzk(1 − σk)l
′
k (16)










where the second equality follows from (4) (5) and we have used the fact
that l
′
i(c − zi) = f
′′
i (li)−1in the last equation.
• The decomposition of the own eﬀect in (15) yields for i = k,
∂yk
∂zk
= Mkk + sklk + (1 − sk)zkl
′
k. (17)




























































































































The second term in (19) is the covariance across districts between zkl′
k

























































k ∆kj = 0 for all j. Letting z =
 



































where the second equality follows from
 
k(zk − z)σk = 0. Substituting


















      
public good eﬃciency
+ (z − zj)
     l
′
j
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′
k
     
dzk
dsj




Therefore, the total willingness to pay (net of the cost) for the match 
ing rate sj corresponds to the two eﬃciency considerations. The pub 
lic good eﬃciency term is positive if a higher matching rate to district j
can bring public good provision closer to its optimal level. Indeed since  
k σk
dzk
dsj = dc/dsj, this term is positive in the case of underprovision when
dc/dsj > 0 and in the case of overprovision when dc/dsj < 0. The produc 
tive eﬃciency term is positive if subsidizing more district j can induce a more
eﬃcient allocation of labour. The ﬁrst component is the own productivity
eﬀect of sj and the second one is the cross productivity eﬀect of sj. The
own productivity eﬀect is positive if (z − zj)
dzj
dsj > 0 so that a higher sj
induces district j to set zj closer to the mean, implying less distortion in
the allocation of labour. In addition, a higher sj also induces a change in
the choice of zk by all other districts k  = j with an overall reduction of the
distortion in the allocation of labour if on average it reduces the spread of
zk so that
 
k =j(z − zk)
     l
′
k
     
dzk
dsj > 0. To sum up,
Proposition 2: (a) Under productive eﬃciency (i.e., zk = z ∀k) and  
k σk
dzk
dsj > 0, the aggregate willingness-to-pay for sj is positive if and only
if there is ineﬃciently low level of redistribution. (b) Under eﬃcient level
of redistribution, the aggregate willingness-to-pay for sj is positive if it pro-
duces a more eﬃcient allocation of labour (i.e., reallocating labour from
over-employment district k where zk > z to under-employment district h
where zh < z).
This proposition suggests the possibility of reaching the eﬃcient level of
redistribution and the eﬃcient allocation of labour through some adjustment
process based upon voluntary contributions. In Section 6 we will explore an
extension of the so called MDP adjustment process for pure public goods.9
9This procedure has been proposed independently by Malinvaud (1972) and Dr` eze and
De la Vallee Poussin (1971).
136 Adjustment process
To achieve productive eﬃciency, matching rates sj must be diﬀerentiated
to induce districts to choose uniform transfer level. To insure that every
district gains, one must introduce k possibly diﬀerent cost shares ϕj in the
funding of the programme. So there are altogether 2k decision variables to
be selected so as to satisfy three conditions:
(i) productive eﬃciency: calling for identical wages and transfers across
districts;
(ii) eﬃcient level of redistribution as required by the Bowen Lindahl 
Samuelson condition;
(iii) individual rationality: such that every district beneﬁts from the
programme.
In principle there are enough decision variables to satisfy the three con 
ditions simultaneously through some adjustment process based on voluntary
contributions. There is a natural adjustment process for the matching rates
and cost shares that will lead agents to the eﬃcient outcome.
Suppose at each point in time districts announce their marginal willing 
ness to pay for matching rates and the procedure that begins at time t = 0
(with sj(0) = 0 ∀j) revises the matching rates and private consumption of

















That is, at each point in time: (i) the matching rate to each district j
is adjusted by an amount equal to the aggregate willingness to pay for this
matching rate; and (ii) each district i pays for this adjustment in matching
rates an amount equal to its own willingness to pay and receives a share δi
> 0 (with
 








j > 0. This procedure has several desirable
properties under truthful revelation of the πij’s. First, it is making every
district better oﬀ at each point in time.11 Indeed letting V i(yi,s) denote
the (quasi linear indirect) utility function of each district i as a function of
its net income and of the matching rates,
10The adjustments in net incomes
.
yi can be obtained through adjustments in the cost
shares.
11The restriction to a quasi-linear objective function is needed to prevent the (Nash)
equilibrium choice of zi to be aﬀected by the redistribution of the surplus resulting from
the adjustment process. With quasi-linearity we have ∂zi/∂y
i = 0 which implies non-





















j > 0 for δi > 0.
Second, every limit point of the process is a Pareto optimum, since then
.
sj= πj = 0 for all j. The monotonicity of the utilities implies the (weak)






which is monotonically increasing with derivative equal to zero only at a
stationary point. The strict concavity of V i implies the global convergence
of the process to a unique stationary point.Therefore we have proven the
following result.
Proposition 3. Under complete information of the districts and truth-
ful revelation, consider the process that, at each point in time, increases the
matching rate to each district by an amount equal to the aggregate willing-
ness to pay for this matching rate and adjusts the cost shares so that each
district pays for this adjusmtent in matching rates an amount equal to its
own willingness to pay while receiving a share of the total surplus produced.
This process is making every district better oﬀ at each point in time. The
process converges to a stationary solution which is a Pareto optimum.
This still leaves open a crucial question however. Why should the re 
gions submit their true preferences and technologies? Might it not some 
times pay to misrepresent one’s preference and technology? The answer
is that it could. Indeed each district could gain from misrepresenting its
willingness to pay so as to manipulate the adjusment process to his onw
advantage (e.g. by claiming low tastes for redistribution to receive higher
matching grants). This issue has been addressed in the litterature for a
pure public good problem where agents announce their willingness to pay
and the regulatory authority provides directly the public good. For instance,
Dr` eze and De la Vallee Poussin (1971) have shown that truthful revelation at
each point in time is a maximin strategy (i.e., the best response to the most
15unfavourable strategies of the other players). Revelation in dominant strat 
egy is more problematic (See Laﬀont, 1988, chapter 5). The main result
here is that truthful revelation is a dominant strategy at a stationary point
(see Dr` eze and De la Vall´ ee Poussin, 1971). Even if participants misrepre 
sent their preference, Roberts (1979) has shown that the MDP process still
generates Pareto optimal outcomes: the eﬀect of preference manipulation is
simply to slow down the adjusment process.
7 Conclusion
The European enlargment is the largest single expansion that the European
Union has ever experienced, with ten countries and 73 million people joining
the club. It is not just the largest EU expansion, but also the most diversify 
ing; the gap in the living standards between existing EU nations and those
that are joining is far wider than in previous enlargments. One of the great
beneﬁts of EU membership for citizens from the new countries is the right
to live and work in the rest of the EU. Although East European economies
have been growing rapidly in the past ten years, average wages are still only
12 percent of those of Britain. Granting immediate employment and full ac 
cess to the welfare state could produce ample migration. Some economists
have argued that open border immigration policy is incompatible with a
welfare state and will trigger a race to the bottom. Other pro immigration
economists argue that it will attract workers who are needed in key sectors
and so will not be a burden on the public budget. For employers, mobil 
ity enables recruitment from a wider pool of workers and helps to alleviate
regional skills shortages. It will attract skills and boost the economy.
In this context, we have examined a ﬁscal competition game in which the
contribution by one state to support the income of its workers may aﬀect
other states through the induced migration. Due to this migration external 
ity the Nash equilibrium is typically ineﬃcient: there is too little redistri 
bution to low skilled workers due to the fear of immigration; and diﬀerent
districts will choose diﬀerent redistributive policies so that wages are not
equalised resulting in ineﬃcient allocation of labour across the federation.
To achieve the eﬃcient allocation, each district must face the correct ”price”
for its choice. Wildasin (1991) proposes a solution involving diﬀerentiated
matching grants. He shows that there exist levels of these matching grants
inducing an eﬃcient Nash equilibrium in spite of district diﬀerences in pro 
duction possibilities and preferences for redistribution. The problem is how
to determine the correct matching rates so that all districts would beneﬁt:
16the regulator may not have access to the information (about technology and
preferences) needed to implement an eﬃcient outcome.
Our purpose has been to design a decentralized process that will im 
plement an eﬃcient allocation, when each district possesses the relevant
information about preferences and technology in the other districts. In ad 
dition to implementing eﬃcient outcomes, the process should be acceptable
to every agent. Our process is based on voluntary matching grants by the
districts themselves. This is a process where districts choose their own trans 
fers and announce the rates at which they will match the transfers in other
districts. We have examined some adjusment process capable of producing
an eﬃcient solution. Under this process the matching rates are progressively
adjusted based on what agents are willing to pay and costs are shared so
that every district gains. We have also proposed a simpler mechanism more
parcimonious in information in which the central authority increases match 
ing rate of the district choosing the lowest transfer and all the districts
simply adjust their own transfer to the new level of redistribution. We have
shown that this process increases total production and the level of redistri 
bution so that total welfare is increasing over time. However, in contrast to
the above mechanism, all districts may not gain, and the process may stop
before attaining the eﬃcient level of redistribution.
References
[1] Bean, C., S. Bentolila, G. Bertola and J. Dolado, 1998, Social Eu-
rope:One for all? London:CEPR.
[2] Brown, C. and W. Oates, 1987, Assistance to the poor in a federal
system, Journal of Public Economics 32(3), 307 330.
[3] Brueckner, J.K., 2000, Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom:
Theory and Evidence, Southern Economic Journal 66(3), 505 525.
[4] Cr´ epon, B. and R. Deplatz, 2002, Une nouvelle ´ evaluations des eﬀets
des all´ egements de charges sociales sur les bas salaires, Economie et
Statistiques 348.
[5] Costello, D., 1993, Intergovernmental grants: what role for the Euro 
pean Community?, European Economy, no 5.
[6] Dr` eze, J.H., and D. De la Vallee Poussin, 1971, A tatonnement process
for public goods, Review of Economic Studies, 38, 133 50.
17[7] Dr` eze, J.H., and J. Greenberg, 1980, Hedonic coalitions: optimality and
stability, Econometrica 48, 4, 987 1003.
[8] Dr` eze, J.H., 2002, Economic and social security: the role of the EU, De
Economist 150, 1 18.
[9] Figui` eres, C. and J. Hindriks, 2002, Matching grants and ricardian
equivalence, Journal of Urban Economics,52, 177 91
[10] Figui` eres, C., J. Hindriks and G. Myles, 2004, Revenue sharing vs ex 
penditure sharing in a federal system, International Tax and Public
Finance 11, 155 74.
[11] Guttman, J. 1978, Understanding collective action: matching behavior,
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 68, 251 55.
[12] Hindriks, J., 1999, The consequences of labour mobility for redistribu 
tion:tax versus transfer competition, Journal of Public Economics 74,
215 34.
[13] Hindriks, J., and G.D. Myles, 2003, Strategic inter regional transfers,
Journal of Public Economic Theory 5, 229 48.
[14] Laﬀont, J. J, 1988, Fondements de l’economie publique, (Coll.
Economie et Statistiques avancees), Economica.
[15] Malinvaud, E., 1972, Prices for individual consumption, quantity in 
dicators for collective consumption, Review of Economic Studies, 39,
385 405.
[16] Oates, W.E., 1972, Fiscal federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New
York.
[17] Pﬁngsten A. and A. Wagener, 1997, Centralized vs. Decentralized Re 
distribution: A case for Interregional Transfer Mechanisms, Interna-
tional Tax and Public Finance 4, 429 451.
[18] Roberts, J., 1979, Incentives in planning procedures for the provision
of public goods, Review of Economic Studies, 46, 283 92.
[19] Roberts, K., 1999, Dynamic voting in clubs, LSE discussion paper No.
TE/99/367.
[20] Sinn, H. V., 1990, Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe,
European Economic Review 34, 489 504.
18[21] Sinn, H. V., 2003, The New Systems Competition, Yrj¨ o Jahnsson Lec 
tures, Blackwell Publishing: Oxford.
[22] Varian, H.R., 1994, A solution to the problem of externalities when
agents are well informed, American Economic Review 84, 1278 93.
[23] Wildasin, D.E., 1991, Income redistribution in a common labor market,
American Economic Review 81, 757 74.
[24] Wildasin, D.E., 1988, Nash equilibria in models of ﬁscal competition,
Journal of Public Economics 35, 229 240.
[25] Wildasin, D.E., 2000, Factor mobility and ﬁscal policy in the EU: policy
issues and analytical approaches, Economic Policy, October, 339 78.
[26] Wilson, J.D., 2006, Protecting the welfare state from international mi 
gration, mimeo, Michigan State University.
19CESifo Working Paper Series 




1804 David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, Does ECB Communication Help in Predicting its 
Interest Rate Decisions?, September 2006 
 
1805 Jerome L. Stein, United States Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control 
Analysis, September 2006 
 
1806 Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: What do 
we really Know?, September 2006 
 
1807 Joerg Lingens and Klaus Waelde, Pareto-Improving Unemployment Policies, 
September 2006 
 
1808 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Raymond Vreeland, Does Membership on 
the UN Security Council Influence IMF Decisions? Evidence from Panel Data, 
September 2006 
 
1809 Prabir De, Regional Trade in Northeast Asia: Why do Trade Costs Matter?, September 
2006 
 
1810 Antonis Adam and Thomas Moutos, A Politico-Economic Analysis of Minimum Wages 
and Wage Subsidies, September 2006 
 
1811 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Christoph Hanck, Cointegration Tests of PPP: Do they 
also Exhibit Erratic Behaviour?, September 2006 
 
1812 Robert S. Chirinko and Hisham Foad, Noise vs. News in Equity Returns, September 
2006 
 
1813 Oliver Huelsewig, Eric Mayer and Timo Wollmershaeuser, Bank Behavior and the Cost 
Channel of Monetary Transmission, September 2006 
 
1814 Michael S. Michael, Are Migration Policies that Induce Skilled (Unskilled) Migration 
Beneficial (Harmful) for the Host Country?, September 2006 
 
1815 Eytan Sheshinski, Optimum Commodity Taxation in Pooling Equilibria, October 2006 
 
1816 Gottfried Haber and Reinhard Neck, Sustainability of Austrian Public Debt: A Political 
Economy Perspective, October 2006 
 
1817 Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser, The Impact of 
Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals’ Financing and Investment Decisions, 
October 2006 
 
1818 Eric O’N. Fisher and Sharon L. May, Relativity in Trade Theory: Towards a Solution to 
the Mystery of Missing Trade, October 2006  
1819 Junichi Minagawa and Thorsten Upmann, Labor Supply and the Demand for Child 
Care: An Intertemporal Approach, October 2006 
 
1820 Jan K. Brueckner and Raquel Girvin, Airport Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, 
and Social Welfare, October 2006 
 
1821 Sijbren Cnossen, Alcohol Taxation and Regulation in the European Union, October 
2006 
 
1822 Frederick van der Ploeg, Sustainable Social Spending in a Greying Economy with 
Stagnant Public Services: Baumol’s Cost Disease Revisited, October 2006 
 
1823 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Cross-Border Mergers & 
Acquisitions: The Facts as a Guide for International Economics, October 2006 
 
1824 J. Atsu Amegashie, A Psychological Game with Interdependent Preference Types, 
October 2006 
 
1825 Kurt R. Brekke, Ingrid Koenigbauer and Odd Rune Straume, Reference Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals, October 2006 
 
1826 Sean Holly, M. Hashem Pesaran and Takashi Yamagata, A Spatio-Temporal Model of 
House Prices in the US, October 2006 
 
1827 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and the US Import Demand 
Function, October 2006 
 
1828 Eytan Sheshinski, Longevity and Aggregate Savings, October 2006 
 
1829 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, Low Take-up Rates: The Role of Information, October 
2006 
 
1830 Dieter Urban, Multilateral Investment Agreement in a Political Equilibrium, October 
2006 
 
1831 Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse, Opt In Versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry Analysis of 
Privacy Policies, October 2006 
 
1832 Wolfram F. Richter, Taxing Human Capital Efficiently: The Double Dividend of 
Taxing Non-qualified Labour more Heavily than Qualified Labour, October 2006 
 
1833 Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, Who’s Afraid of Foreign Aid? The Donors’ 
Perspective, October 2006 
 
1834 Dirk Schindler, Optimal Income Taxation with a Risky Asset – The Triple Income Tax, 
October 2006 
 
1835 Andy Snell and Jonathan P. Thomas, Labour Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-
Unemployment Dynamics, October 2006 
  
1836 Peter Backé and Cezary Wójcik, Catching-up and Credit Booms in Central and Eastern 
European EU Member States and Acceding Countries: An Interpretation within the 
New Neoclassical Synthesis Framework, October 2006 
 
1837 Lars P. Feld, Justina A.V. Fischer and Gebhard Kirchgaessner, The Effect of Direct 
Democracy on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland, October 2006 
 
1838 Michael Rauscher, Voluntary Emission Reductions, Social Rewards, and Environmental 
Policy, November 2006 
 
1839 Vincent Vicard, Trade, Conflicts, and Political Integration: the Regional Interplays, 
November 2006 
 
1840 Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Stability and Dynamics in an Overlapping 
Generations Economy under Flexible Wage Negotiation and Capital Accumulation, 
November 2006 
 
1841 Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser, Taxation and 
Capital Structure Choice – Evidence from a Panel of German Multinationals, November 
2006 
 
1842 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Alexandros Kontonikas, The Euro and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the European Monetary Union, November 2006 
 
1843 Jan K. Brueckner and Ann G. Largey, Social Interaction and Urban Sprawl, November 
2006 
 
1844 Eytan Sheshinski, Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium, November 2006 
 
1845 Marc Suhrcke and Dieter Urban, Are Cardiovascular Diseases Bad for Economic 
Growth?, November 2006 
 
1846 Sam Bucovetsky and Andreas Haufler, Preferential Tax Regimes with Asymmetric 
Countries, November 2006 
 
1847 Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite, Should Courts always Enforce 
what Contracting Parties Write?, November 2006 
 
1848 Katharina Sailer, Searching the eBay Marketplace, November 2006 
 
1849 Paul De Grauwe and Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser, A Behavioral Finance Model of the 
Exchange Rate with Many Forecasting Rules, November 2006 
 
1850 Doina Maria Radulescu and Michael Stimmelmayr, ACE vs. CBIT: Which is Better for 
Investment and Welfare?, November 2006 
 
1851 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Mario Cerrato, Black Market and Official Exchange 
Rates: Long-Run Equilibrium and Short-Run Dynamics, November 2006 
 
  
1852 Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite, Active Courts and Menu 
Contracts, November 2006 
 
1853 Andreas Haufler, Alexander Klemm and Guttorm Schjelderup, Economic Integration 
and Redistributive Taxation: A Simple Model with Ambiguous Results, November 
2006 
 
1854 S. Brock Blomberg, Thomas DeLeire and Gregory D. Hess, The (After) Life-Cycle 
Theory of Religious Contributions, November 2006 
 
1855 Albert Solé-Ollé and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the 
Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for 
Spain, November 2006 
 
1856 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Understanding the Latest Wave and Future Shape of Regional 
Trade and Cooperation Agreements in Asia, November 2006 
 
1857 Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mörk, Jørn Rattsø and Hanna Ågren, Using a Discontinuous Grant 
to Identify the Effect of Grants on Local Taxes and Spending, November 2006 
 
1858 Ernesto Crivelli and Klaas Staal, Size and Soft Budget Constraints, November 2006 
 
1859 Jens Brøchner, Jesper Jensen, Patrik Svensson and Peter Birch Sørensen, The Dilemmas 
of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged European Union, November 2006 
 
1860 Marcel Gérard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, 
“Coopetition” in a Bottom-up Federation, November 2006 
 
1861 Frank Blasch and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, When Taxation Changes the Course of the 
Year – Fiscal Year Adjustments and the German Tax Reform 2000/2001, November 
2006 
 
1862 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Competition for Viewers and 
Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly, November 2006 
 
1863 Bart Cockx, Stéphane Robin and Christian Goebel, Income Support Policies for Part-
Time Workers: A Stepping-Stone to Regular Jobs? An Application to Young Long-
Term Unemployed Women in Belgium, December 2006 
 
1864 Sascha O. Becker and Marc-Andreas Muendler, The Effect of FDI on Job Separation, 
December 2006 
 
1865 Christos Kotsogiannis and Robert Schwager, Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick 
Competition, December 2006 
 
1866 Mikael Carlsson, Stefan Eriksson and Nils Gottfries, Testing Theories of Job Creation: 
Does Supply Create Its Own Demand?, December 2006 
 
1867 Jacques H. Drèze, Charles Figuières and Jean Hindriks, Voluntary Matching Grants Can 
Forestall Social Dumping, December 2006 